Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

State of Utah v. Gary Randall Whetton : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorney for
Appellee.
Dee W. Smith; Public Defender; Attorney for Defendant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Whetton, No. 20040969 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5358

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
GARY RANDALL WHETTON,

Case No. 20040969-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THIS APPEAL IS FROM A PLEA AND SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING
TO TEN COUNTS OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD IN VIOLATION
OF U.C.A. § 76-10-1801, AND THREE COUNTS OF UNLAWFUL
DEALING BY A FIDUCIARY, IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §76-6-513(2).
ALL THIRTEEN COUNTS WERE SECOND-DEGREE FELONIES. IN
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH THE HONORABLE SCOTT M. HADLEY
PRESIDING.
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

DEE W. SMITH (8688)
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION, INC. OF WEBER
COUNTY
2550 Washington Boulevard, Ste 300
Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801) 366-0100

Telephone: (801) 399-4191

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
GARY RANDALL WHETTON,

Case No. 20040969-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THIS APPEAL IS FROM A PLEA AND SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING TO
TEN COUNTS OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.
§ 76-10-1801, AND THREE COUNTS OF UNLAWFUL DEALING BY A
FIDUCIARY, IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §76-6-513(2). ALL THIRTEEN
COUNTS WERE SECOND-DEGREE FELONIES. IN THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH THE HONORABLE SCOTT M. HADLEY PRESIDING.
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

DEE W. SMITH (8688)
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION, INC. OF WEBER
COUNTY
2550 Washington Boulevard, Ste 300
Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801)366-0100

Telephone: (801) 399-4191

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

7

STATEMENT OF FACTS

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

12

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
SENTENCED
THE
DEFENDANT
TO
SERVE
SIX
CONSECUTIVE ONE TO FIFTEEN YEAR SENTENCES
12
CONCLUSION

19

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

19

ADDENDA:
Addendum A: Appellant's Date Stamped Copy of Notice of Appeal
Addendum B: Sentence, Judgment and Commitment
Addendum C: Transcript Pages R.244/18-33

I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
UTAH STATE CASES
Delandv. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172,174 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

17

Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902,908 (Utah 1993)

14

Linden v. State, 81 P.3d 802,804 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)

14

Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508,512 (Utah 1994)

14

State v. Denney, 116 P.2d 91,92 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

2

State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

16

State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399,402 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

17

State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,398,399 (Utah 1994)

16

State v. McDonald, 110 P.3d 149,151 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)

2

State v. Schreuder, 112 P.2d 264,277 (Utah 1985)

14

State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115,120,121,122 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

15,16

USXpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115,1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

17

Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757,759 (Utah 1990)
In Re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853,866 (Utah 1996)

2
18

STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§ 76-3-401

2,3,4,8,12,14,15,16,17,18

§76-10-1801

1,4,5

§76-6-513(2)

1,5

§77-27-5

5,6,7,13,14

§78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003)

1,7

i

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

vs.

:

Case No. 20040969

GARY RANDALL WHETTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a plea and subsequent sentencing to ten counts of
Communications Fraud in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-1801, and three counts of
Unlawful Dealing by a Fiduciary, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-513(2). All thirteen
counts were second-degree felonies. On October 4, 2004, the Honorable Scott M.
Hadley signed an entry of judgment, sentence and commitment sentencing the
Defendant to serve thirteen indeterminate terms of one to fifteen years at the Utah
State Prison. Six of the counts were ordered to run consecutive to each other. On
November 3, 2004, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DIDTHE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO SIX CONSECUTIVE ONE
TO FIFTEEN YEAR SENTENCES?
Standard of Review: This should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard of review. "Sentencing decisions of the trial court are reviewed for abuse
of discretion, including the decision to grant or deny probation and the decision to
impose consecutive sentences." State v. McDonald, 110 P.3d 149, 151 (Utah Ct.
App. 2005). Furthermore, "judges may exercise sentencing discretion [only| within
those limits established by the legislature." State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. 76-3-401 should be
reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
See, Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). This issue was
preserved when Defendant's attorney asked the trial judge to sentence the
Defendant to two consecutive sentences. (R. 244/29).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
U.C.A. §76-3-401 Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations —
Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for
the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of
judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each
other; and
2

(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs
of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be
inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the
court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are
to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided
under Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing
by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as
follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
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(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently
with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence
so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the
commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been
terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the
person is located.
U.C.A. § 76-10-1801 Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties.
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to
be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as
provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense
described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
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Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of
value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and
offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over;
or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail,
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and
written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
U.C.A. §76-6-513(2) Definitions — Unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary
— Penalties.
(2) A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary if he
deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of a
governmental entity, public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner which
he knows is a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of loss or
detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.
A violation of this Subsection (2) is punishable under Section 76-6-412.
U.C.A. § 77-27-5 Board of Pardons and Parole authority.
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision
when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state,
persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or
correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise
limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, ordered to pay restitution,
or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted
or terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The chair shall
appoint members to the panels in any combination and in accordance with rules
promulgated by the board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons.
The chair may participate on any panel and when doing so is chair of the panel.
The chair of the board may designate the chair for any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no
parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a full
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hearing before the board or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any
action taken under this subsection other than by a majority of the board shall be
affirmed by a majority of the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing before the
board.
(e) The board may determine restitution as provided in Section 77-27-6 and
Subsection 77-38a-302(5)(d)(ii).
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing shall
be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's office responsible for
prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law enforcement officials responsible
for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible, the victim or the
victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by the
board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms that are
reasonable for the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations or
terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final
and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the
obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as provided in
Section 77-27-6.
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. However,
respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the Board of
Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or terminate the
respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as
provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the governor may suspend
execution of the sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next
session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or commute the sentence, or
direct its execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders serving
sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their fines or
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, the board shall
consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to make restitution as
ascertained in accordance with the standards and procedures of Section 77-38a302, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or
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forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence.
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall consider
the offense committed by the parolee, the parole period as provided in Section 763-202, and in accordance with Section 77-27-13.
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003) Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged with thirty-one second degree felonies. The
charges were all for communications fraud, issuing a bad check and unlawful
dealing by a fiduciary. (R. 19-25). On August 10, 2004, the Defendant appeared in
front of the Honorable Scott M. Hadley and pled guilty to thirteen second degree
felonies. (R. 161-162). Sentencing was scheduled for October 4, 2004. At the
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked the Court to sentence the Defendant to
three of the counts consecutive to each other. The State told the Court that it could
run all of the charges consecutive, but that it was asking that counts one through
six be run concurrent with each other, that count fifteen run consecutive to one
through six and that counts twenty through twenty-five run concurrent with each
other but consecutive to the prior sentences. (R. 255/20-21).
This proposed sentence would have resulted in essentially a three to fortyfive year sentence. The Court stated to the prosecutor that "my understanding then
under the statute with the - - the parameters that I would have would put the
7

maximum then at 30 years, minimum

at 3 years under the

State's

recommendation." (R. 255/21). The prosecutor responded "Well, no. Forty-five
years. It would be a maximum of 45 years." (R. 244/21).
The Court's again stated that "I thought the statute limited me when there
were multiple counts like this to 30 years, regardless." The prosecutor indicated
that the court may be correct and that he hadn't read that. (R. 244/21) The
prosecutor also asked that the Defendant not be given credit for the jourteen
months that the Defendant had been in jail for. (R. 244/22).
Defendant's attorney informed the Court that he believed that the Court
could only sentence two of the one to fifteens to run consecutive.

He also

requested that the Court give the Defendant credit for the fourteen months which
he had been in jail. (R. 244/25).
After Defendant's attorney asked for only two of the charges to be run
consecutive, the prosecutor informed the court that he believed that the Court could
not make the minimum sentence exceed thirty years. (R. 244/25-26). During the
hearing, the Court looked up U.C.A. §76-3-401. The trial judge read the statute and
upon his reading of subsection (6)(a), he believed that if he was to rum three
sentences consecutive, it would result in a three years to thirty year sentence. (R.
224/29). The Court also believed that based on its reading of the statute that he
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had discretion to sentence the Defendant anywhere from one to thirty years up to
thirteen to thirty years. (R. 224/30).
The Court sentenced Defendant to thirteen indeterminate terms of one to
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. The Court ordered that counts one to six
were to run consecutive to each other, and that the remaining counts were to run
concurrent. In the Court's mind, that resulted in a minimum sentence of six years
and a maximum of thirty years. (R. 224/33).
The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on October 4, 2004.
(R. 166-169). A notice of appeal was filed on November 3, 2004. (R. 187). The
Court date stamped the notice of appeal on November 10, 2004.

(R. 187).

However, Defendant's appellate attorney who filed the notice of appeal had it date
stamped at the court and it was stamped on November 3, 2004. (See, addendum
#1). For some unknown reason, the Court didn't date the official copy until
November 10,2004.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged with multiple second degree felonies for
conduct that was related to his attempt to purchase Nordic Valley Ski Resort. The
Defendant agreed to purchase Nordic Valley for four and a half million dollars.
($4,500,000.00). The closing was to take place on December 31, 2001. The
Defendant was to take control of the ski resort on January 1, 2002 and as part of
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the agreement he would do the day-to-day management and keep all of the
revenues that were generated.

On approximately December 26, 2001 the

Defendant approached one of the owners and told him that he needed 1o delay
closing until January 14, 2002, because he was waiting for funding. Nonetheless,
the Defendant took over operating the ski resort on the first of January and he kept
the revenues that were generated beginning January 1, 2002. On January 13, 2002,
the Defendant indicated that he needed to delay closing again because Zion's Bank
was holding thirty-three million dollars of his and they wouldn't release it to him.
The Defendant delayed closing a third time, but he wrote out several checks to the
stockholders of Nordic Valley. He tendered the checks on January 18, 2002, but
they were post dated to February 25, 2002. Counts one through six were related to
Defendant's activities with Nordic Valley.
After Defendant took over operations of Nordic Valley he contacted the Jack
Johnson Company and contracted with them for services. Defendant wrote the
Jack Johnson Company a check for $97,500 that bounced. The company alleged
that they completed approximately $600,000 worth of services. Count fifteen of
the Information that Defendant pled guilty to was related to his activities
associated with the Jack Johnson Company.
At approximately the same time, the Defendant lined up investors for an
Internet Company called Play-It.

The Defendant received approximately
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$487,000.00 in investment money.

He then used some of this money for an

automobile, a television, computer equipment, and other personal expenses that
were unauthorized. He also presented the investors with a phony analyzer report
that indicated that the web site was receiving hundreds of thousands of "hits." In
August of 2002, the Defendant produced a licensing agreement between Play-It
and a company called Cyber Link Systems which was supposedly a subsidiary of
Direct TV. It was later discovered that Direct TV did not have a subsidiary named
Cyber Links, and the licensing agreement was fabricated. Counts twenty through
twenty-five were related to the Play-It company. (R. 243/Preliminary Hearing
Transcripts).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant has requested that counsel appeal the trial court's decision to
sentence him to serve six consecutive one to fifteen year sentences. Although the
trial court's belief was that the maximum sentence was for thirty years, the
Defendant's concern is that the Board of Pardons can and will keep him for longer
than thirty years because when the totals are added up, the maximum aggregate
sentence is ninety years. It was the legislature's intention that a defendant under
this Defendant's circumstances not be ordered to serve more than thirty years.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
SENTENCED
THE
DEFENDANT
TO
SERVE
SIX
CONSECUTIVE ONE TO FIFTEEN YEAR SENTENCES.
This issue centers on whether the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing the Defendant to six consecutive one to fifteen sentences and if the
court's statutory interpretation was correct. The statute in question is U.C.A. §763-401(2004). This statute addresses a court's imposition of consecutive sentences.
Subsection (6)(a) states that "[i]f a court imposes consecutive sentences, the
aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years
imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b)."

The trial court

correctly found that subsection (6)(b) didn't apply.1 (R. 244/28).
The trial court apparently focused on subsection (8). This subsection reads:
When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the
effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be
served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as
though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a)

if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and

(b)

when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed
minimum terms.

1

Subsection (6)(b) applies to offenses for which death or a life sentence is authorized or situation where the
defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his initial sentence was
imposed.
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The trial court interpreted this section to mean that thirty years was the
maximum the Defendant could be sentenced to but that if the sentences were run
consecutive it would affect the minimum sentence. (R. 244/28-33). With that
interpretation of the statute, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six
consecutive sentences of one to fifteen years. The court stated; "In my mind, that
would be a minimum sentence then of six years, maximum of 30 years." (R.
244/33).
The problem is that the trial court can't sentence the Defendant to a term of
six to thirty years. The Court imposed six consecutive sentences. When the
maximums are added, the result is a minimum sentence of six years and a
maximum of ninety years. The Defendant acknowledges that subsection (8)(a)
states that when the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30 year limitation the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years.
The problem that arises is that U.C.A. §77-27-5 gives the Board of Pardons
exclusive authority to determine how long an individual will actually serve and
these decisions are not subject to judicial review. "Decisions of the board in cases
involving paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution,
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review."
U.C.A. §77-27-5(3)(2004).
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In Linden v. State, 81 P.3d 802 (Utah Ct App. 2003), this Court stated that
a

[u]nder the terms of Utah's indeterminate sentencing system, the Board is given a

wide degree of discretion in determining how much of a sentence a convicted
person must serve." Id. at 804. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the judge
does not determine the number of years the defendant will spend [in prison]. That
is left to the unfettered discretion of the board of pardons." Labrum v. Utah State
Bd of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 908 (Utah 1993).
Under Utah's sentencing scheme, "the board of pardons acts as a sentencing
entity, having exclusive authority to determine [] the actual number of years a
defendant is to serve." Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994)(alteration
in original). See, also, State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985)("our
sentencing system vests almost complete discretion in the Board of Pardons to
determine the period of time that will actually be served.")
These statutes are inconsistent because on one hand section 76-3-401 states
that if the aggregate sentence exceeds thirty years the maximum will be considered
to be 30 years. However, Section 77-27-5 leaves the decision as to the actual time
up to the Board of Pardons and the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this section
to mean that judges do not determine the number of years a defendant is to serve
and the Board of Pardons has almost complete discretion that is rarely subject to
judicial review.
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Even though the trial court indicated that the maximum was for thirty years,
it ran six one to fifteen year sentences consecutive. The math does not add up to
thirty years. To ensure that the thirty year maximum was imposed the trial court is
limited to sentencing the Defendant to two consecutive one to fifteen sentences.
This would have been in harmony with the legislature's intent that a maximum
sentence not exceed thirty years.
In State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court addressed
section 76-3-401 in the context of a consecutive indeterminate sentence that was
run consecutive to a federal determinative sentence. This Court stated that u[w]e
construe 76-3-401 in the context of the entire sentencing framework to give effect
to the entire statutory scheme." Id. at 121. This Court also stated that section 76-3401 does "not preclude the imposition of consecutive sentences, but merely
restricts the effect of consecutive sentences." Id. at 120. (alterations in original).
Under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, the effect of six consecutive
one to fifteen year sentences is that the Board of Pardons has discretion to decide
how long the Defendant will stay in prison. The number of years could well exceed
the thirty year limit the Legislature intended. In State v. Swapp, this Court affirmed
the trial court's imposition of a consecutive indeterminate sentence to the federal
sentence. However, the language is applicable to this case. This Court stated that
"we affirm the trial court's sentence of a term of not less than one year nor more
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than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, a term to run consecutively to and at the
end of any and all determinate sentences imposed in federal court, with the
limitation that all sentences cannot exceed thirty years." Id. at 121-22. In the case
at bar, the Defendant's sentences do exceed fifteen years.
In State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court addressed
a situation with an issue almost identical to the one in the case at bar. In Horton,
the defendant was sentenced to seven consecutive sentences that exceeded thirty
years. This Court held that section 76-3-401 "does not preclude the imposition of
consecutive sentences that total more than thirty years, but merely restricts the
actual time served to be no more than thirty years." Id. at 715.
The Defendant recognizes that the holding in Horton is contrary to his
position in this case.

Nonetheless, he wants to appeal his sentencing and

respectfully requests this Court to overrule its prior case law. In State v. Menzies,
889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]hose asking us
to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion." Id. at 398.
Before an appellate court overrules prior cases it must be "clearly convinced that
the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing
conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent."
Id at 399.
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The Defendant would suggest that the Legislature's intent that a Defendant
not be sentenced to serve more than thirty years can be disregarded by the Board of
Pardons who has almost unfettered authority on sentencing decisions that is not
subject to judicial review.
When a court construes a legislative enactment, the court's primary
responsibility is "to give effect to the intent of the legislature." State v. Jones, 735
P.2d 399, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Deland v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court stated that when "we construe a statute, we first
explore its plain language and use other modes of interpretation only if the
language contains ambiguities. Unless a literal reading would render the statute's
wording unreasonably inoperable or confusing, we accord the wording its 'usual
and accepted meaning' and do not' look beyond plain and unambiguous language
to ascertain legislative intent.'" Id at 174 (quoting US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm % 886 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).
The Defendant would suggest that section 76-3-401 's wording is confusing
and unreasonably inoperable. On one hand, the statute limits the maximum to
thirty years, showing the Legislature's intent. However, subsection (10) of the
statute states that "[t]his section may not be construed to restrict the number or
length of individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the
validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences
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actually served under the commitments." U.C.A. §76-3-401(10).

Again, it is

impossible to limit the length of the sentence when the length is to be determined
by the Board of Pardons. It makes no sense to state that a maximum aggregate
sentence is to be for thirty years and then say "but we're not going to limit the
number of years that a defendant can actually be sentenced to serve." This is
exactly what section 76-3-401 does. Subsection (6)(a) explicitly states that "[i]f a
court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. . ." Then, four subsections later
the statue says u[t]his section may not be construed to restrict the number or length
of individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed . . . "
If doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning of a statute "the court should
analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize it provisions in accordance with the
legislative intent and purpose." In Re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996).
What is clear from section 76-3-401, is that the Legislature intended that
defendants not be sentenced to more than thirty years on second degree felonies.
The only way to insure that a criminal defendant in the Defendant's position is not
sentenced to serve more than thirty years is to limit the number of one to fifteen
year consecutive sentences to two.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
remand his case back to the trial court with instructions that only two of his
sentences can be run consecutive to each other.
DATED this ^_ day of August, 2005.

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

vs.

)

GARY RANDALL WHETTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

) Case No. 031902992
)

COMES NOW the above named Defendant, Gary Randall Whetton, by and through
his attorney, Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal the
sentence, judgment, and conviction that was entered hereon in the above-entitled case on or
about the 4,h day of October, 2004, to the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this

day of November, 2004.
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'

RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Notice of Appeal to:
Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd, Second Floor
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Office of the Attorney General
160 E 300 S, 6 th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Utah Court of Appeals
P . O . Box 140241
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
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ADDENDUM B

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 031902992 FS

GARY RANDALL WHETTON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

SCOTT M HADLEY
October 4, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
marykd
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE
Prosecutor: MARK R DECARIA
CAMILLE L. NEIDER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RYAN BUSHELL
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 18, 1972
Video
CHARGES
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004
COMMUNICATIONS
FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
15
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004
20 COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004
21. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Page 1

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

Case No: 031902992
Date:
Oct 04, 2004
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty
22. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty
23. UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY FIDUCIARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty
24. UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY FIDUCIARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty
25. UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY FIDUCIARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty
HEARING
The prison sentence imposed on counts I - VI is to run
consecutively to each other but concurrently to the
prison sentence imposed on count XV and counts
XX -XXV. The prison sentence imposed on count XV and
counts XX - XXV may run concurrently each other and to
the prison sentence imposed on counts I - VI. (Minimum
of six years with a maximum of 3 0 years pursuant to
State Statute 76-1-401 (6) (a) .
The defendant shall pay defense costs accrued in this
case as a condition of parole. The defendant shall also
pay restitution as a condition of parole. The restitution
amount shall be determined at a Restitution Hearing on
11/29/04.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
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Case No: 031902992
Date:
Oct 04, 2004
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY
FIDUCIARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY
Page 3

Case No: 031902992
Date:
Oct 04, 2004
FIDUCIARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY
FIDUCIARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends credit for time served of 14 months.

RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 11/29/2004
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Location: 2nd Floor Southwest
Second District Court
252 5 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: SCOTT M HADLEY

Dated this

*/

day of

(Po^U^l

20 a Y .

SCOTT M HADLEY
District Court Judge
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Stella Perea
at (801)395-1062 at least three working days prior to the
proceeding. The general information phone number is (8 01)
395-1071.
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ADDENDUM C

Ms. McNeely.
MS. McNEELY:
thing.

Yes.

I just wanted to say one more

I think Randy Whetton should be sentenced to life in

prison and I think he should have very limited visitation
rights with his young children.

I cannot imagine what kind

of a role model he would be to them.

I think this is

something the Court should take into consideration.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

From the State?
MR. DECARIA:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, if I might, I think, of course, you're aware
that there is very little that I could say in addition to
what you've heard from victims here today that really would
mean as much and carry the weight and power that victims
themselves, from their own mouths, can impart to the Court.
And so I don't want to spend a lot of time on -- on that.
And I recognize that there is going to be a restitution
hearing to determine as best as we can what the total number
is that Randy Whetton should pay and what these individual
stakeholders in this fraud and scheme to defraud them really
have lost.
He has pled guilty to Counts 1 through 6.
apply directly to Ski Associates.

Those counts

He pled guilty to

Count 15, which was the count that involved the defrauding of

Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS
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and the efforts and energy put into the Nordic Valley
development by Jack Johnson Company, which to some degree,
the Court may understand, has worked as a detriment to the —
the owners of Ski Associates because under the direction
of -- of Mr. Whetton, Jack Johnson put efforts in there and
really tore up the golf course, tore up parts of that ground
that make them unreclaimable for purposes of using them or
replacing that property back into a usable enterprise for —
for Ski Associates again.
So from that perspective, Jack Johnson Company is not
here, he's a victim, but his energies actually worked to
further victimize the owners of the -- of Ski Associates.
And then, of course, Counts 20 through 25, those six
counts apply directly to the Play It defraud for Mr. Otto and
that Play It organization.
I think one of the things that was mentioned by one of
the people that spoke about the —

the message that should be

sent in a case like this, that message should be that crime
does not pay.

And I think that's one of the by-products of

sentencing.
In order to assure that there is ample time for
Mr. Whetton to ponder his abuses while he sits in jail — or
prison, excuse me, and for once released on parole -- which
we all know that eventually he will be —

that the other

entities such as the Board of Pardons have sufficient power
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over him while on parole to ensure that he make a meaningful
dent in restitution, I would ask that the Court sentence
Mr. Whetton to 1 to 15 —

three 1 to 15s consecutive:

One

1 to 15, which is the six counts involved from Ski
Associates; Count number 15, a 1 to 15, the count involving
Jack Johnson Company; and the six counts involving Play It,
another 1 to 15, and run those counts consecutive.
I know that the Court could run them all consecutive,
but I don't —

I —

it's not my belief that Mr. Whetton would

get any additional time on running them all consecutive.
THE COURT:

Can you say that again for me so I

have -MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:
MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:
MR. DECARIA:
Counts 1 through 6.
Associates.

Okay.
—

the Statefs position correctly?
Right.

I might have —
Hefs got —

he —

he pled guilty to

Those are the counts that apply to Ski

He pled guilty to Count 15, which is a count

that applies to Jack Johnson Company.

And he pled guilty to

Counts 20 through 25 which account —

which are those counts

for Mr. Otto and that Play It computer system.
And so what Ifm requesting of this Court is to sentence
him to -- on Counts 1 through 6, 1 to 15 on each, concurrent
with each other; on Count 15, a 1 to 15 sentence consecutive
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to the sentences on 1 through 6; and Counts 20 through 25,
run those sentences concurrent with each other, but
consecutive to the prior two.

So he gets three separate

1 to 15s, consecutive to each other.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. DECARIA:

Does that make sense now?

THE COURT:

It —

it does.

We f re asking for three separate

MR. DECARIA:
consecutive 1 to 15s.
THE COURT:
statute with the —

And my understanding then under the
the parameters that I would have would

put the maximum then at 30 years, minimum at 3 years under
the State's recommendation.
MR. DECARIA:

Am I

Well, no.

be a maximum of 45 years.

—
Forty-five years.

It would

One to 15 plus -- possible top of

15, possible top of 15 on the second group, and a possible
top at 15 on the third group would be a total of 45 years.
THE COURT:

But I thought the statute limited me

when there were multiple counts like this to 30 years,
regardless.
MR. DECARIA:
that.

Well, you know, you may be correct on

I haven't read that.
THE COURT:

But we're really talking about the

minimum in any event, right?

That's the important part in

terms of --
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1

MR. DECARIA:

The 1 to 15s?

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. DECARIA:

Yeah.
But it gives the Board of Pardons

4

ample time to have Mr. Whetton repose in the facility at the

5

Weber -- at the state prison.

6

THE COURT:

7

But under this recommendation then, he

would have a minimum of three years, correct?

8

MR. DECARIA:

9

THE COURT:

10
11
12

has served?

That would be the minimum.
Okay.

And what about the time that he

What's the State's position on that?

MR. DECARIA:

We'd ask that he not be given credit

for that time.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. DECARIA:

Okay.
There's a very good reason for that,

15

Your Honor, because while he was in jail pending the court

16

process, he was there, the community was secure from his —

17

from his devices.

18
19
20
21

Thank you.
THE COURT:

I didn't mean to interrupt you.

Did —

was there more you wanted to say, Mr. DeCaria?
MR. DECARIA:

No.

Really, that covers it,

22 I Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Ms. Neider, anything else from —

24 J from you, from the State?
25

MS. NEIDER:

Judge, I was prepared to talk about the
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restitution.

I think based on the amounts that they have in

the PSI, it's actually closer to 1.5 million dollars that
we'll be talking about at the restitution hearing because of
the losses of Jack Johnson Company weren't included in that
total that's in the body of the PSI.

We're prepared to deal

with that at a restitution hearing.
THE COURT:
that —

Would you agree, though, Ms. Neider,

I mean, obviously, I have the discretion to impose a

fine, too, but it seems like that would be inappropriate
given the expected amount of restitution.

I would rather

money go to victims, if any money comes out at all.
MS. NEIDER:
think we would

I would —

I would agree, Judge.

I

—

THE COURT:

It doesn't seem worthwhile to talk about

fines, does it?
MS. NEIDER:

We didn't anticipate requesting a fine,

Judge.
THE COURT:
MS. NEIDER:

Okay.
Any money that he may be able to

generate lawfully we'd ask go straight to restitution.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And I wondered about the Jack

Johnson portion, too, because although the presentence report
says it's unable to determine, that's mostly because
Mr. Whetton's now got the victims fighting amongst
themselves.
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But it's -- it's clear that six to $700,000 worth of
work was done.

It's just a matter of who's going to —

now

the victims have to fight it out because they know they're
not going to get it from Mr. Whetton.
MS. NEIDER:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

Some of that may —

But that's really a pretty solid figure.

MS. NEIDER:

Some of that may be civil.

They had at

least $98,000 in hard costs that they had expended, and then
they had done plans and projections for a lot of the rest of
it.
But we would need somebody here from Jack Johnson and we
would bring them for the restitution hearing for you to hear
from them.

I don't think they actually ended up testifying

at the prelim, but maybe they did about the work that they
did and how much they had expended and then how much they had
expected from the contract that they had entered into.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Thank you.

Anything else

from the State then?
MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Bushell?

MR. BUSHELL:

Yes, Your Honor.

If I may, I'd like

to address the sentencing recommendations of the State.
Your Honor, it's my understanding -- and I may be
incorrect on this -- but with the sentencing the State is
requesting three separate 1 to 15s.

It's my reading of the
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statute —

I don't have a copy before me and I apologize —

that the most he could be sentenced to with this many counts
is two separate 1 to 15s.
If that were the case, Your Honor, and you wanted to run
those consecutive, we would ask this Court to follow a two —
two 1 to 15s consecutive —

consecutive sentences, and put

the minimum amount at two years.
We are also requesting, Your Honor, credit for time
served.

Mr. Whetton has been locked up for 14 months pending

the outcome of this.

He does have a family, two small

children and a stepdaughter.

You read the reports.

He's a

good father and good husband.
He realizes he's made a mistake.

He's willing to do

the -- the time and make the restitution that will be decided
at a later date.
We would ask Your Honor if it is in this Court's
discretion to sentence consecutive, that only two of the
counts be sentenced consecutive.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. DECARIA:
here?

Okay.
Your Honor, can I venture something

My belief about maximums and minimums is that the way

the Code works, applying mostly to first degree felonies that
carry five to lives, that if the Court intended to stack five
to lives, the Court could not make the minimum on, you know,
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ten 5 to lives, more than 30 years.

I don't think it applies

to maximums.

]

MS. NEIDER:

Minimums.

MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:
important.

Excuse me.

To minimums.

Well, I've got it here.

I think this is

Let's go over it to make sure at least we agree

on what the law is so that -- I'm looking at 76-3-401.
Would it help if I passed out —

I've got a copy here,

but I can pass out the actual Code and maybe all counsel can
look at that.
MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:
MR. BUSHELL:
THE COURT:

Can I approach, Your Honor?
You may.
May I follow?
Okay.

In fact, you might want to take

this back with you so our -- everybody can hear.
I -- I think it's important we get this part right so we
know what discretion I do or don't have.
victims ought to be aware of that, too.

I think the -- the
There it is.

It's

on that page.
First of all, while —

while counsel are looking at

that, I do want to speak to the victims.

And thank you for

sending information and for sending it to the Court on time.
Often we get these literally as we're walking into court and
they're of little use then.

Even if you can read them, it

takes some time to digest it and kind of get what the victims
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are feeling, so thank you for doing that.
But while they're looking at that a little bit, I do
want the victims to understand in Utah we sentence to
indeterminate terms, meaning that the Court basically sets
large parameters, but the actual time that's spent is not
decided by the Court.
and Parole.

It's decided by the Board of Pardons

So the -- the Court sets broad parameters, but

that's about it.
For instance, on a third degree felony, if the Court —
and that's not this case.

I'm just giving you an example.

But on a third degree felony, the possible sentence is zero
to five years.

So that's all the Court does is say we

sentence you to prison for zero to five years.

And then the

Board of Pardons and Parole says, you know, whether that's
one day or five years.
So that's -- that's kind of how it works.

So when we

talk about 1 to 15 years on one count, the Court sentences
Mr. Whetton to 1 to 15 years and then my job is done.

Then

the Board of Pardons and Parole says whether that's one year
or fifteen years or something in between.

So just so you'll

understand, it's not as if I sit here and give the exact
amount of time.
But now with that said, let me turn back to counsel.
In -- I'm looking at section (6) of that -- of section 401
and it says, if a Court imposes consecutive sentences, the
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aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30
years imprisonment, except —

and in my opinion, those

exceptions do not apply.
So arenft I faced with that's the maximum?

And it seems

like regardless of whether I say it or not here today, that
the Board of Pardons and Parole would treat it that way.

Am

I reading that wrong?
MR. BUSHELL:

Your Honor, in my reading, I believe

you're reading it correctly.
THE COURT:

That that would be the maximum that the

Board of Pardons and Parole could do.

Even if I said

consecutive on all 13 count, 30 would be the maximum.
For the State, do you read that differently?
MR. DECARIA:

I don't.

I read it the same.

Under those circumstances, Your Honor, I —

I'm not sure

we're satisfied with three consecutive 1 to 15s.
THE COURT:

Well —

well, let me go on then to see

if this changes anything that the State may want to say or
the defense.
Then in subsection (8) it says, when the limitation of
subsection (6) (a) applies -- that's the 30 year -- it says
determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the
manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons
and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of
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the validity —

or of the validly, I guess, imposed prison

terms as follows:

If the aggregate maximum term exceeds the

30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be
30 years.

So that's on the maximum end.

And when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the
minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the
validly imposed minimum terms.
So that's where I'm reading that if —

if the State says

three consecutive terms and the rest to run concurrent, that
basically I'm looking at then 3 to 30 years is what the State
would be recommending that I do.
And at this point, I think the defense would be saying
two, right?
MR. BUSHELL:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Right.

Which if —

right would be ~- mean 2 to 30 years.

if I'm reading these
Is that the defense's

position?
MR. BUSHELL:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Okay.

Anything else the defense would

like to say about that, just in terms of what the Law is?
want to make sure the range -MR. BUSHELL:

Your Honor, I believe that is a

correct reading of the law.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, back to the State.

reading that incorrectly or is there --
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Am I

I

MR. DECARIA:

Well, I think you're reading it

correctly that it —

it would be 3 to 30 under the State's

recommendations.
THE COURT:

Right.

And I didn't know if my reading

then changes the State's position or not because it —

what I

view I have discretion on is, first of all, probation or not
probation.

I think most would agree that's probably not

appropriate.

I know Mr. Whetton said that when we took his

plea that he didn't believe that he would get probation.
We've talked about fines.

They're probably somewhat

meaningless in this case.
So if we are looking at prison, my view is I have
discretion to go from —
to 30 years.

anywhere from 1 to 30 years up to 13

That's what I view I have discretion to do.

And -MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:

I think you' re correct.
And/or to impc>se fines, but as

Ms. Neider says, in my mind theBy appear to be meaningless
MR. DECARIA:
meaningless.

Right.

I —- I think fines are

I'd rather have 1Lhat money go to victims.

THE COURT:

Even if f ines were imposed, wouldn't any

monies collected first go to victims?
MR. DECARIA :
THE COURT:

True.

Okay.

So does that change <anything that

the Stcate would like to say?
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MR. DECARIA:

Your Honor, I think the way —

if

—

if I might make a recommendation, the way this ought to be
sentenced is you sentence him to three 1 to 15s consecutive
and let the Board make a determination as to how the statute
is applied.

You don ! t need to say 3 to 30.

You say three

consecutive 1 to 15s.
THE COURT:

Okay.

But, in essence, then the State

would stand by its recommendation made earlier, correct?
MR. DECARIA:

I suppose.

It's the appropriate

recommendation.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Anything else from the

defense?
MR. BUSHELL:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Okay.

Ms. Vincent, did you wish to be

heard at all?
MS. VINCENT:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Okay.

that would help me out.

I do have one further question

In -- in addition to reading all

that Ifve read and hearing from the victims and from
Mr. Whetton and those who support him, it does seem like this
sentence, whatever it is, should be proportionate to the
crimes that he has admitted doing and to when other people
have committed similar crimes.
Do you feel, from the State's end, that the
recommendation being made is proportionate in that sense?
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For instance, with other types of crimes of this nature with
this many counts?

Is it —

MR. DECARIA:
THE COURT:

is it in the ballpark that way?

Yes.
Okay.

And what about from the defense

side?
MR. BUSHELL:

Your Honor, obviously the defense is

going to have a little different take on -- on this.
Proportionality is something that comes before the Court
often enough.

I know recently Mr. Wayne Ogden was sentenced

to somewhat -- somewhat similar charges with a lot more money
and he did two 1 to 15 years on that.
All that being said, I think, however, that the sentence
recommendation is something that both Mr. Whetton and I knew
was going to happen.

We —

we think that it's proportional

for the crimes that Mr. Whetton did admit to and pled guilty
to.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Anything else by any party

then before sentence is announced?
MR. BUSHELL:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Okay.

Let me just look at my own notes

real quick.
Okay.

You ready?

MR. BUSHELL:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

Okay.

Okay.

Mr. Whetton, itfs the

sentence of this Court in connection with your conviction of
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1

10 counts of a second degree felony, communications fraud,

2 I and two counts —
3

excuse me, three counts of, also, second

degree felonies, unlawful dealing with property by a

4 I fiduciary, a total of 13 second degree felonies, that you be
5
6
7

sentenced as follows.
That you be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 13
indeterminate terms of 1 to 15 years, and that you be ordered

8 I to pay restitution to the victims in an amount to be
9

determined at a restitution hearing.

And that you pay

10

defense costs as a condition of your -- any release on

11

parole.

12

That Counts 1 through 6 run consecutive with each other

13

and the remaining counts run concurrent.

14

would be a minimum sentence then of six years, maximum of 30

15

years.

16
17

And we'll set it for a restitution hearing -- Ifm
assuming it would take quite some time.

18

MS. NEIDER:

19

THE COURT:

20
21 I

In my mind, that

Most of the day, Judge.
You think a day?

Okay.

I did not bring

my calendar out.
Mary Kaye, do you have yours —

22

THE CLERK:

I do.

23

THE COURT:

—

so we can set that?

Okay.

We've had

24

some spaces, I think -- well, I don't know if they opened up

25

or not.
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